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DONALD WLHELM, JR.*
I. THE PROBLEM
Everybody agrees that small business should have adequate loan and equity
capital on reasonable terms and conditions. But disagreement arises as to whether
small business already has such access and, if it does not, how it can get it.
For example, a study' published in 1939 concludes as follows:
The needs of small borrowers in the fields of business and personal finance alike are
being well taken care of by the commercial banks.
Meanwhile an investigation in 19352 had found that
... there exists a genuine unsatisfied demand for credit on the part of solvent borrowers,
many of whom could make economically sound use of working capital.
And a study3 conducted in 1938 under the auspices of the Department of Com-
merce revealed that of a sample of 6oo firms chosen because of their relatively high
commercial ratings, 75 percent indicated that they were unable to obtain permanent
capital in the regular markets, 40 percent indicated that they had no source of long-
term credit, and 45 percent indicated difficulty in obtaining funds for working
capital purposes. *
The testimony of small businessmen themselves, and of their trade association
representatives, often adds to the general confusion. For example, of the witnesses
who testified in hearings held by the Ohio Small Business Commission in the first
half of 1944,
"Some . . .were of the opinion that the Government should make loans or guarantee
loans to small business, but others were equally insistent that they wanted no Govern-
ment help. Of 24 firms questioned in one town, i8 said that they do not have access to
the same sources of capital as big business has. . .."
* A.B., X938, Yale College; graduate work, Yale University and Graduate School of Public Admin-
istration, Harvard University. Division of Small Business, Department of Commerce; previously in
Statistics Division, Office of Production Research and Development, and Office of the Chairman, War
Production Board.
1 EDwxARs, How BANxs LEND (Research Council of the American Bankers Association, New York,
1939) 10.
2 HARDY AND VINER, REPORT ON ThE AvAiLABILiTy oF BANK CREDIT IN TE SEVENTH FEDERAL RV-
sERV Disyutr (Washington, 1935) vi.
'For a summary of this study see Stoddard, Small Business Wants Capital (1940) i8 HARv. Bus.
Rav. 265, 271-2.
'Whaley, Business Worries Not All Government (Jan. 1945) DOMESTIC COMMERCE 14.
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And it is reported' that bankers who testified at the same hearings "as a rule
deplored not only Government regulations and restrictions on loans but also com-
petition from finance companies and cooperative credit associations."
How can methodical studies on the small business credit problem reach such
divergent conclusions? And how can the "hard-boiled" testimony of small busi-
nessmen themselves, and of their bankers and trade association people, lead to the
same contradictions? The following quotation perhaps contains a clue:
"The banks of the country ... are going to make sure that enterprise has adequate
credit for every legitimate use and has that credit in the form best adapted to each par-
ticular business. ' 6
The vagueness of the concepts "adequate credit," "legitimate use," and "the
form best adapted to each particular business" is at once apparent. Since this quota-
tion is taken from a press release, it cannot properly be censured for failing to
define its terminology carefully; but the concepts employed in the quotation are all
too frequendy used in more or less scholarly discussions of the small business credit
and capital problem. Nor is this always a matter of mere carelessness, for it is
actually no easy task to define such terms. For example, is small business access to
short-term credit "adequate" if prevailing rates and collateral requirements are well
above those for the same type of loans made to large businesses? Some would
argue yes, because loans to small concerns are more risky and cost more to service;
others would argue no, on the grounds that differences in risks and in costs, though
real, are not great enough to justify the prevailing differentials, or on the grounds
that the situation should be equalized, arbitrarily if necessary, because it competi-
tively handicaps small business.
It seems evident, therefore, that if the private and governmental sources of funds
are to be usefully analyzed and evaluated from the point of view of small business
needs, improved criteria are necessary. The following criteria, though by no means
perfect, are proposed as a test for each of the sources of credit and capital:
i. What proportion of the total loans which this source makes goes to small business?
2. How do its rates to large borrowers compare with its rates to small borrowers?
How do the accommodations this source offers small and large borrowers com-
pare in other respects?
3. If large borrowers generally obtain from some other source the type of money
vhich small borrowers obtain from this source, what are the comparative rates
and other conditions?
Notice that each of these criteria is relative rather than absolute, and that it is
relative in terms of small vis-a-vis large business. This is justifiable because most
of the credit and capital problems of small business are not absolute problems.
They are problems which are acute primarily because, in this country today, small
ibid.
o American Bankers Association, Post-War Small Business Credit Commission (New York), press
release, October 16, 1944, quoting Mr. Robert W. Hanes, Chairman of the Commission.
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businesses compete with large businesses not only in designing, producing, and
marketing products and services, but also in obtaining the funds with which to
operate and expand.
II. PRIVATE SoURCEs OF SMALL BusINEss CREIT AND CAPITAL: COMMERCIAL
BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES
The Commercial Banks
The commercial banks have traditionally been the major source of business loan
capital in this country. They are still by far the largest single source. For ex-
ample, a study7 made in 1935 of a sample of small manufacturers indicated that
well over. 8o percent of the borrowing firms normally depended upon banks8 for
working capital purposes, and some i8 percent for long-term capitalY Since the
commercial banks are being treated in another article in this symposium, the present
paper will attempt only a brief summary and evaluation of them as a source of
small business funds.
As of June 30, 1944, total outstanding commercial bank loans amounted to some
$21 billion ° Even in a pre-war year like 1937, they stood (on June 30) at over
$17 billion. 1 Unfortunately, there are no satisfactory quantitative data, either by
type of loan, type of borrower, or type of accommodation by type of borrower, as
to how this huge volume was broken down. Lack of available over-all information
on its business lending activities is in fact one of the most notable characteristics of
our commercial banking system as it exists today.
In the field of short-term commercial loans, the situation is clouded not only by
a startling lack of exact information, but also by virtue of the fact that demand
and short term loans often become intermediate or long-term credits before they
are fully repaid. This is illustrated by one of several studies' of the lending opera-
tions of banks in a number of Pennsylvania and Ohio industrial communities.
Business loans at five sampled banks were classified as roughly 24 percent demand
loans, 71 percent short-term loans, 3 percent intermediate-term loans, and 2 percent
long-term loans?3  In terms of elapsed time before the loan or its extension was
repayed, however, 46 percent of the loans were of short term, 20 percent of inter-
mediate term, and 31 percent turned out to be of long term. The loans having a
'U. S. DEP'T OF COMm., SURVEY OF REPORTS OF CREDIT & CAPITAL DIFFICULTIES (1935) 65.
sThis figure may, however, include industrial banks.
' The reliance of these firms on banks for long-term credit requirements appears to indicate that
they resorted to using renewable notes to provide long-term money. ,
10 (Ian. 1945) 31 FED. RES BULL. 48 (table).
A substantial proportion of these outstandings were, of course, in the hands of intermediate
credit agencies such as factors and sales finance companies.1 2 MCKEE, C. W.: (I) ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY IN THE SHENANGO AND MAHONINO VALLEYS;
(2) USE AND USERS OF BANK CREDIT IN INDUSTRIAL CoMMUNITIEs; (3) SIZE, SECURITY, ANiD INTEREST
RATES ON BANK LOANS IN INDUSTRIAL COMIUNITIES; and (4) MATURITiEs, RENEWALS, AND TURNOVER OF
BANK LOANS IN INDUSTRIAL CoMMUNImuTIES (American Economic and Business Foundation, Inc., New Wil-
mington, Pa., 1941).
1" McKEE,' C. W., MATURITIES, RENEWALS, AND TURNOVER OF BANk LOANS IN INDUSTRIAL COMMUNI-
TIES, supra note 12, Schedules 3 and X5 .
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long elapsed credit term were, incidentally, on the average larger than those having
a short elapsed term. The sampled banks were in the country bank class; city
banks are probably on the whole stricter in holding to stated maturities. And in
any event short-term renewable loans are recognized as being an unsatisfactory
form of intermediate credit, both because they are expensive when used for this
purpose (thus leading to high fixed charges) and because they contain an element
of uncertainty which makes sound business planning difficult.
Short-term commercial bank loans can be classified in any of a number of ways,
for example according to maturity (demand loans and time loans), form (secured
or unsecured), class of borrower (loans to customers of different sizes, loans to
banks, etc.), purpose, etc. 4 In practice some of the more common types are so-
called "character" loans, loans under lines of credit, loans secured by warehouse or
field warehouse receipts, short-term equipment loans secured by the purchased
equipment, and miscellaneous other short-term business loans varying mainly as
to type of collateral involved.
In the McKee study already referred to, unsecured "character" loans were found
to be virtually non-existent in the industrial areas surveyed. Collateral-free "char-
acter" loans have in fact become more and more limited to large enterprises of
well-recognized stability. Small concerns have likewise experienced increasing diffi-
culty in securing lines of credit.
Not only collateral requirements but also interest rates tend to weigh more
heavily on small companies than on large. Though here again the data are sparse,
studies by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system, covering a large
representative group of member banks, indicate that borrowers with small assets
pay, for short-term commercial loans, interest rates averaging over three times as
high as those paid by borrowers in the group having the largest assets.j' The dis-
crepancy is further accentuated by the practices, which weigh relatively more heavily
on the smaller borrower, of discounting interest in advance and requiring a mini-
mum average balance. 6
In addition to making these conventional types of short-term loans, many com-
mercial banks have recently become active in accounts receivable financing. It is
estimated that in 1941 the commercial banks advanced over one-third of the $2.6
billion total volume of receivables financing,' 7 and that one out of every four com-
mercial banks was active in receivables financing in that year. 8 Small manufac-
turers, wholesalers, retailers, and service concerns make wide use of bank loans
x' Cl. FOSTR AND RODGERS, EDITORS, MONEY AND BANKING (Prentice-Hall, New York, 1940), 248-263.
' (Nov. 1942) 28 FED. REs. BULL. xogi. Also WEISSMAN, SMALL BUSINESS AND VENTURE CAPITAL
(New York, Harper, '945) 34-35.
%a Thus, if $i,ooo is borrowed for one year at a stated rate of 6 percent, with interest (.e. $6o)
deducted in advance, and the borrower is required to maintain an average deposit balance of 20 percent,
or $2oo, he is paying 56o for the use of $74o-an effective rate of 8.11 percent.
" The remainder was supplied by factors and commercial finance companies.
" SAULNIER AND JACOBY, ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE FINANCING (National Bureau of Economic Research,
New York, 1943) 4.
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secured by the pledge of accounts or notes receivable. Banks make such loans on
either a notification basis (where the bank informs all affected debtors of the trans-
action and secures payment directly from them) or a non-notification basis. Interest
rates average around 5 percent or 6 percent, although separate service charges often
increase the effective rate to 7 percent or 8 percent.' Maturity periods are generally
not longer than 6o days, although the note is often renewed.
The banks have in many cases also expanded their installment loan activities to
handle small business loans as well as loans to individual consumers. Such loans
generally run for a year or less. They are usually for from $ioo or less to $i,ooo,
though some of them go up to $2,ooo or $3,ooo. The small businessmen's signature,
perhaps plus that of his wife or business associate, will usually get him an install-
ment loan; or he may be required to put up his automobile or offer one of the more
usual types of collateral such as cash value of life insurance, mortgages on real
estate or plant, or accounts or notes receivable. The loan is generally repaid in
monthly installments. Interest rates on bank installment loans are high, commonly
ranging from 7 percent to as much as 2o percent or in some cases more.
To satisfy intermediate credit requirements the banks are increasingly making
term loans. Though they are akin to the older debenture, term loans as such first
became cofnmon in the i93o's. A term loan is definable as a business loan that is
repayable, according to prior agreement between lender and borrower, after a
period of more than one year?0 Term loan maturity periods average around 5
years but often run to io or 15 years. Term loans are frequently unsecured when
made to large firms, but less often when made to small concerns. Term loan con-
tracts usually include specific provisions for repayment out of earnings. Interest
rates on commercial bank term loans are in striking inverse relation to the size of
the loan. While i percent or 2 percent is not an unusual rate on large term loans,
from 5 percent to 7 percent is commonly asked on small term loans?'
Up to the present, term loans made by banks and insurance companies have
been mainly to large or medium-sized companies-generally to companies with assets
of over a million dollars. Large companies are more and more using term loans
instead of short-term renewable loans, and instead of public security issues. The
American Bankers Association as well as certain individual banks have recently
announced programs which avowedly will increase term lending to small business.
During the period 1934-41, the average asset size of business firm securing term
loans from commercial banks apparently tended to increase slightly rather than to
decrease. 2
" 1d. at 134-5.
20 cf. JAcoBY AND SAULNiER, TR.M LENDING TO BUSINESS (National Bureau of Economic Research,
New York, 1942) Ch. i. The definition of a term loan may also well include an upper stated maturity
limit to distinguish it from long-term credits. Fifteen years (i.e., under 16 years) makes a good arbi-
trary ceiling. See id. at 56.
" 1d. at Chapter 6.
2 2 1d. at 68. Cf. also POST-WAR SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT COMMISSION: PURPOSES, ORGANIZATION, MET1S-
ODS OF OPERAToN (American Bankers Association, New York, undated), p. I: "By 1940 . . . some 3,000
banks had two and a half billion in term loans outstanding. For the most part, these were the larger
banks and larger loans, averaging about $6ooooo each."
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Trust Companies and Bank Trust Departments.- Trust companies and bank
trust departments are a minor source of short and long-term business funds. For
example, in the Commerce study previously referred to24 approximately i percent
of the replying firms used trust companies as a source of working capital.2 5 The
conditions of such loans depend entirely upon the stipulations of the particular
trust plus the discretion of trust officers in acting under the trust.
Credit Groups. The correspondent bank relationship, under which larger banks
help smaller banks to make loans and render other services they cannot easily handle
on their own, has for many years been characteristic of commercial banking in
this country. Although in some cases the correspondent relationship has made
small banks subservient to large ones, on the whole the system has probably been
advantageous to large and small banks and to the business community generally.
Recently, the Post-War Small Business Credit Commission of the American
Bankers Association has carried this concept a step further by sponsoring the for-
mation of bank credit groups 6 Set up on an area basis, such groups are intended
to help banks band together to meet credit needs which they cannot handle indi-
vidually or on a correspondence basis. Extended discussion of this topic is omitted
from this article since it is fully discussed elsewhere in this symposium 2r
Conclusion. The field of commercial banking is plagued by an extreme scarcity
of reliable data on the size and type of business loans made, the rates and other
conditions set on such loans, and the size and type of business receiving them.
Application of the three tests mentioned in Section I nevertheless suggests the fol-
lowing conclusions:
Both small and large businesses still rely heavily on the commercial banks for
funds. Yet the range of bank loans available to small concerns is much more lim-
ited than those available to their large competitors. Banks provide large business
with intermediate credit through term loans, including extended equipment loans,
and, in effect, through "continuous" lines of credit. Small firms, on the other hand,
are in general confined to short-term loans which, even where renewable, are recog-
nized as an unsatisfactory and expensive source of intermediate credit.
On short-term loans the rates to small borrowers are almost invariably higher-
frequently three times or more higher-than the rates to large borrowers; and small
borrowers, unlike large ones, are generally required to furnish collateral. Rate
differentials are further increased by virtue of the fact that small borrowers must
often resort to short-term loans for long-term purposes. Moreover, the practice of
2aMutual savings banks are not discussed in this paper because, while they hold investment port-
folios and make mortgage loans, they are in general prohibited by law from making other types of
business loans.
" U. S. DEP'T op Commse., op. cit. supra note 7, at 66.
" It is possible, however, that some firms mentioning trust companies were using the banking de-
partments of trust companies.
"' The ABA prefers the term "groups," as applied to this program, rather than "pools," since the
funds, though they are considered to constitute a "credit reservoir" for each area, are not actually
pooled in advance.
"' Drew, The Role of the Commerdal Bank, infra p. 386.
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deducting interest in advance and the common requirement of a minimum balance
tends to weigh more heavily on small borrowers than on large.
The fact that large concerns enjoy greater access to certain other sources of funds
(described below) still further increases their competitive advantage over small
concerns which rely on bank borrowing.
Trust companies and bank trust departments are at best a minor source of busi-
ness funds.
It is too early to draw conclusions on the effect of the bank credit group pro-
gram on the availability of small business loan funds. So far there appears to be no
evidence that it will reduce the differential between large and small companies;
nor has this reduction even been specifically announced as one of the objectives of the
program.
III. OTHR PRIVATE SOURCES OF FUNDS
In addition to commercial banks and trust companies, small business relies to
greater or less extent on a number of other private sources of funds. These other
sources include industrial banking companies, small loan companies, factors, insur-
ance companies, commercial paper houses, equipment manufacturers and other sup-
pliers, trade credit, private venture capital, the capital markets, parent companies, and
private industrial development groups.
Industrial Banking Companies. Some industrial banks to all intents and pur-
poses resemble the traditional commercial bank, while others resemble small loan
companies; yet the industrial banks are really in a group by themselves. Though
precise definition is difficult, an industrial banking company may be described as
any bank that specializes in consumer installment loans and gets at least part of its
working capital from customer deposits, the sale of small-denomination "investment
certificates," or both s Morris Plan banks are typical of industrial banks. Total
credit outstandings of all industrial banking companies as of the end of 1938 are
estimated as roughly $250 million2
The term "industrial bank," though somewhat of a misnomer, was originally
coined because of the early emphasis of such banks on consumer loans to industrial
workers. The industrial banks have continued their emphasis on reaching "the man
in the street,"30 but the number of business loans made by such banks has been in-
creasing in recent years. It is estimated that in x938, for example, some 12 percent
of the outstanding loans of insured industrial banks were commercial and industrial
loans.3 ' Moreover many of the personal loans made to individuals are for business
purposes.
Industrial bank loans range from as low as $5o to as much as $io,ooo, depending
2 Ct. SAULNIER, INDUSTRIAL BANKING COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTICES (Nat'l Bureau of
Economic Research, 1940) 12-14.
t SAULNIER, id. at 27.
20 See, for example, Boushall, Seven League Boots for Business (Oct. 1944) BANKING 29 (President
of the Morris Plan Bank of Richmond).
3 1 SAULNIER, Op. cit. supra note 28, at 78.
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among other things on the law in the particular state. For example, in Arizona,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, cash loans up to $i,ooo are permissible; in Kentucky,
$2,000; in Colorado and Rhode Island, $5,ooo. In some cases (for example, in the
District of Columbia, which restricts such loans to $2oo), industrial banking com-
panies operate under regular bank charters, and so are able to lend much larger
amounts. The length of time for which loans may legally be made also varies from
state to state. Typically it is one year or two years. Some states have no legal
limitation.
The rates industrial banks may charge are regulated by law in many states; but
competition with banks and' small loan companies often brings the rates to well
below the legal maximum. Unlike the personal finance company, which usually
levies its charge as a specified rate per month on unpaid principal balance, the indus-
trial banking company generally quotes its loan charge as a certain rate of discount
plus a charge for credit investigation 3 2 Some companies omit the credit investiga-
tion fee; others vary it inversely with the size of the loan. Six to eight percent is
a common rate of discount. But since industrial bank loans, like personal finance
company loans, are paid off in regular installments, the effective interest rate is
typically (since the "average" size of the loan is approximately half its face value)
about twice the stated rate.
In 1938 the average size of loan made by a sample of ten Morris Plan banking
companies was $288 3 Applying the first of the three criteria, it seems clear from
this and other evidence that industrial banking companies, in so far as they make
industrial and commercial loans, make them mainly or almost exclusively to small
business. While industrial banking companies grant somewhat more favorable
rates and other conditions on their larger loans than on their smaller ones, the
differential is on the whole not great.
As applied to industrial banks the third criterion is the most important. Large
companies almost universally obtain from some alternative source the type of funds
that many small concerns obtain from industrial banks. And here there is no
comparison between the respective rates and other conditions. A small concern
which borrows at an industrial bank is likely to pay a total effective charge of from
12 percent to 20 percent or more per annum for short-term money which a large
company can get for I to 4 percent per annum. This comparison is not necessarily
a reflection on the industrial banks, which specialize in lending operations which,
to be profitable, require relatively high rates of interest.
Small Loan Companies. The activities of small loan companies (otherwise known
as personal finance companies) 4 in some ways resemble those of industrial banks
"a Id. at 91-95. This statement and the following remarks should be qualified by pointing out that,
as already implied, some so-called industrial banks operate under charters which permit them to offer
the same services and follow the same procedures as regular commercial banks.
33 Id. at 85.
"( Small loan companies are also sometimes called simply "finance companies," a vague term which
is frequently applied indiscriminately to any or all of the "intermediate" financing institutions. Cf.
Vas-rRFIsLD, MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING (The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1938) 1014 if.
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and commercial bank installment loan departments; but in general they lend smaller
amounts and their charges are higher. Most state laws limit small loan companies
to loans of $300 or less. The law often allows them to charge interest as high as
30 to 42 percent on a percent-per-year basis. The quoted rate is usually expressed
as a percent per month of the unpaid balance. Keen competition among small loan
companies often drives th& rate below the legal maximum.
As Young states,35 "Practically the entire credit market tapped by personal
finance companies is composed of ifidividuals, mainly urban residents, whose an-
nual incomes are between $500 and $350o." But many of these individuals appear
to be business proprietors, and professional people. For example, one of the leading
small loan companies reports3 6 that approximately io percent of the number of loans
it makes go to business proprietors, and about 2.6 percent more to professional
people other than school-teachers.
The average size of small loan company loans is very small; in x937 it was only
$i47 for a sample compiled from data supplied by the state banking departments of
thirteen states. 7 Other data indicate that the loans made to business proprietors
in Detroit by one of the leading small loan companies generally ranged from $135
to $x85 Ps Thus it seems clear, in answer to the first of the test criteria, that small
loan company loans made for business purposes go to small businesses.
When applied to the small loan company, the second criterion, relating to the
comparative rates and other conditions to large as against small borrowers, is hardly
applicable since all or nearly all of its business is done with small borrowers. Appli-
cation of the third test of course leads to the statement that large concerns, who
never or practically never resort to personal finance company borrowing, can obtain
working money far more economically from several alternative sources. The small
business which obtains a personal finance company loan is competitively handi-
capped not only by paying interest at perhaps 25 percent per annum as against
several percent for bank money, but also by having to put up substantial collateral
compared to the collateral-free bank loan which the large concern is often able to
obtain.
Factors. Factoring companies or factors are concerns which specialize in buying
outright the receivable accounts of their clients. The client concern-a textile man-
ufacturer, for instance-usually relies on his factor's advice as to what trade credit
he should extend. He then sells all his accounts receivable to the factor without
recourse; that is, the factor agrees to take any losses on the purchased receivables.
Factoring companies have been operating in various parts of the world since the
fourteenth century. Although there were only some 17 factors (not counting
branches) in this country as of 1940, it is estimated that they did about $8oo million
worth of business. In addition there are in many cities self-styled factoring con-
cerns which do not actually purchase receivables but instead merely make loans on
"g RALPHI A. YOUNG and AssocIATES, PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRATICES
(National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1940) 51.
"
1Id. at loo. 'lid. at 47. " 1d. at 99.
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the security of accounts receivable. (Commercial banks and other financing institu-
dons also often make loans on accounts receivable.)
The factors are geographically very poorly distributed, since most of them are
located in New York City, with a few companies in Boston, Chicago, and other
large cities. In the past, most of the clients of factors have been textile manufac-
turers, converters, and selling agents. Lately the factors have extended their serv-
ices into such fields as shoes, home furnishings, petroleum products, radio tubes,
lumber, coal, and metal products; but it is estimated that these non-textile fields
still account for only about io percent of factoring volume?0 In the textile field,
the clients of the factors include all sizes of concerns ranging from the smallest to
the very largest. For the bulk of their clients the factors hold somewhere between
$3o,ooo and $3ooooo in receivables for each client at any one time, "with most of
the factoring business originating in the larger accounts....40
Appraisal of factor charges is complicated by the fact that the factors do not
merely lend money but also render various management services including the
selection and collection of risks. The factor's commission, which may run from
•75 percent to 2 percent of the sales cashed, is designed to remunerate him for these
latter services. In addition he charges interest which, though higher in years past,
is now in the neighborhood of five or six percent. Although total charges vary
according to the volume and quality of the receivables the client offers, there appears
to be no clear evidence that large and small clients receive different treatment.
In terms of the test criteria, then, a large proportion of the factors' clients are
in the small business category. The factors apparently offer more equality of
treatment to varying sizes of clients than is accorded by most of those financial
institutions which are patronized by both large and small concerns. With regard
to the last of the three criteria, although the large company can and generally does
get cheaper money from its bank connections or out of income than it does in
effect from a factor, the "extra" services rendered by the factor help to equalize this
differential. Thus the small company which patronizes a factor for the particular
segment of its financial needs which the factor is equipped to handle, is not neces-
sarily at a marked competitive disadvantage compared with its larger rival in meet-
ing these particular needs.4 '
Insurance Companies. Insurance companies make mortgage loans on improved
residential and commercial property and in some cases on industrial property. Small
retailers and owners or purchasers of other small commercial properties, as well as
home owners and purchasers, are often able to obtain such mortgage loans.
Insurance companies also extend long-term credits by buying bonds and notes
issued by large corporations. The insurance companies are in addition making an
increasing number of business term loans other than mortgage loans. To date
" SAULNIER AND jAcOBy, op. dt. supra note 18, at 6o.
40 Ibi.
" For an interesting discussion of other services rendered by the factors, see Hsu.La, KEYs To
Busimtss CAsn (Harper, New York, 1942).
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these loans have gone entirely to the larger companies (those with assets of over
$i million)#4 The average individual insurance company term loan has been in
the neighborhood of $3.8 million. Moreover most of these term loans are unsecured.
These loans, while doubtless a proper type of insurance company investment, fur-
ther increase the credit and capital handicap of small business.
In the future the insurance companies may find it desirable to extend term loans
to diversified types of small concerns. This movement may be given impetus by
virtue of the fact that insurance companies as lending institutions are expected to
be eligible under RFC's new loan-guarantee program (discussed in pages that
follow).
Commercial Paper Houses. The commercial paper houses or dealers 43 provide
business concerns with short term funds by purchasing their notes at a discount on
the open market and then selling these notes to investors, principally banks. Com-
mercial paper volume outstanding reached its peak ($1,296 million)4& in 1920 and
has been much below that level ever since. In January 1945, for example, com-
mercial paper outstandings amounted to $130 million.45 The decline in the use of
commercial paper is traceable to some of the same factors which reduced the ratio
of commercial bank loans and discounts to total commercial bank resources by
more than half between 192o and 1940.48 Nevertheless, the commercial paper house
warrants consideration in that its rates are so low. As Greef states, 47 "The average
rates on prime paper for the years i919-i935 ... were undoubtedly lower than the
average rates charged by banks on direct loans to their own customers" during the
same period. Discount rates have not averaged more than i percent in any year
since 1934. In the latter part of 1941 the rate for prime commercial paper (4 to 6
months)"' reached a low point of .5o percent; as of January 1945, the rate stood at
.75 percent.4 9  In addition to the discount the commercial paper dealers charge a
commission which ranges from 8 of i percent, or less, to Y of i percent of the
face value of the paper; the average commission is probably something less than
of i percent. 0 Thus in the last few years the total charge to the borrower has
stood at less than i percent of the face value of the notes offered. In general the
commercial paper house is the most economical institutional source of short-term
funds.
42 JAcoBY AND SAULNIER, Op. cit. supra note 20, at 3, and passim.
" Note brokers, who handled commercial paper on a commission basis without actually purchasing
it, were formerly important but are now of minor significance.
"' GaEF, TnE COMMERCIAL PAPER HoUsE IN THE UNITED STATES (Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1938) Table 2.
(March, 1945) 31 F-. Rs. BULL. 252 (table).
46 WILLIs, THE FUNCTIONS OF TE COMMERCIAL BANKING SYSTEM (King's Crown Press, Columbia
University, New York, 1943) ch. 8; GREEF, op. cit. supra note 44, ch. 3 and p. ioo; also, the Winter,
1939, issue of THE INDEX (N. Y. Trust Co.) 66-67.
' GREEF, op. cit. supra note 44, at 320.
s U. S. D-r'T OF COMM., SURVEy OF CURRENT BUSINESS, 1942 SUPPLEMENT, 65.
(March, 1945) 31 FED. REs. BULL. 253 (table).
90 GREEP, op. cit. supra note 44, at 350.
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Small business is for the most part unable to take advantage of this low-cost
money source. As Westerfield states : r
"In general the open market borrowers are large concerns. . . . The reasons for the
large proportion of large concerns is that the broker [or dealer], whose earnings come
from a narrow commission, does not find it worth his time to bother with the small
batches of paper of small concerns. Most of his expenses do not vary with the size of
the issue, but are the same for large and small amounts. Furthermore, the brokers find
it so difficult to sell paper of concerns having resources from $ioo,ooo to $150,0oo that
they usually refuse to undertake such sales, and many cater only to firms with a half-
million or more assets. The market for the paper of small and less-known concerns is
restricted since banks find it harder to look them up and satisfy themselves as to the
quality of the paper, although the small concerns are often quite as good for the amount
they borrow as are the larger ones for the proportionately large amounts they require."
In terms of the test criteria, the commercial paper houses are practically unavail-
able to small business as a source of short-term funds; the rates charged by them
to small business therefore cannot be indicated. On the other hand large companies
that are able to make use of this source can obtain short-term money therefrom
at rates lower than from any other standard institutional source.
Equipment Manufacturers and Other Suppliers. Manufacturers of various types
of industrial equipment offer financing plans under which the purchaser of the
equipment can buy it on terms and pay for it out of income. This affects small
business in two ways: in its capacity of manufacturer of such equipment, and in
its capacity of purchaser of such equipment.
As purchasers of such equipment small companies are, at least in theory, pro-
tected from discrimination as to price or terms offered by the Robinson-Patman
Act and corresponding state statutes. Thus the first two test criteria lead to the
conclusion that both large and small concerns to some extent use equipment sup-
pliers as sources of credit, and that nominally there is no discrimination as to terms
offered. Applying the third test, however, we find the picture clouded by the fact
that large companies, far more than small, are able to buy industrial equipment
and supplies for cash and thereby not only avoid the cost of special time-payment
arrangements but also take maximum advantage of cash, quantity, and trade
discounts.
Small business in its capacity of producer of industrial equipment (or, for that
matter, of agricultural equipment, consumer durable goods, et cetera) finds itself
at a marked disadvantage in that it so often does not have the financial resources
which are more and more employed by larger competitors to provide special install-
ment payment provisions for customers5
"WESTERIELD, MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING (Ronald Press, New York, 1938) soo6.
' The rapid growth of the sales finance company, which buys installment paper from retail and
other businesses, has not removed this disadvantage. The rates charged by such companies, though sub-
ject to wide variation, are well above the costs encountered by large concerns in handling their own
paper or discounting it at their banks. For a discussion of sales finance company charges, see PLuMmEn
AND YouNG, SxALES FINANCE CompAmEs AND TEIR CREDIT PRACTICES (National Bureau of Economic
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Trade Credit. In addition to the forms of installment credit mentioned in the
preceding section, small business relies heavily on trade credit extended on a non-
installment basis by manufacturers to wholesalers and jobbers, and by these to
retail trade in supplying inventory and equipment in advance of payment. Such
credit is highly important to the wholesale and retail trade;"' indeed many small
wholesalers and retailers could never get started or continue in business without it.
While such credit has probably, at least from the immediate point of view, facil-
itated the distribution of goods and services, it has a number of disadvantages. In
the first place few small companies can say what such credit costs them; if the cost
is exorbitant, they frequently do not detect the fact. Second, the presence of at-
tractive cash discounts may and Often does mean that those firms who obtain short-
term credit by not taking advantage of the discounts do so only on an expensive
basis. Third, much trade credit is really bank credit furnished indirectly through
the wholesaler (or other supplier) as an intermediary; the retailer tends to pay two
charges on such credit. Fourth, trade credit relationships are not infrequently used
for coercive purposes. Wholesalers may with immunity fill orders with inferior
goods, or they may threaten to close credit if a retailer tries to carry competing
brands. Fifth, the small distributor or manufacturer who is dependent upon trade
credit is at a decided disadvantage compared to the company which can get credit
from alternative sources; the latter concern can not only "bargain down" the cost
of credit, but, more important, it can use its credit to "bargain down" the prices
of the goods it buys. Ability to pay cash on delivery or within a few days' time
(or even to advance money to help finance the manufacturer or other supplier-
trade credit in reverse, this might be called) gives any company a powerful com-
petitive advantage, particularly when it is dealing with small suppliers. Access to
adequate "bargaining capital" is indeed one of the most important reasons why
large manufacturers and distributors get goods at lower prices. Sixth, small man-
ufacturers, jobbers, and wholesalers, commonly lack the bank accommodations5 4
necessary for them, in their capacity as suppliers of trade credit, to match the
accommodations offered by their large competitors.
In terms of the test criteria, a very large proportion of the short-term credit
extended by manufacturers, jobbers, and wholesalers goes to their smaller customers.
Although satisfactory quantitative data on the subject are scarce, it appears that
this credit is often on an expensive basis, that the effective interest rate is often
hidden, and that small concerns which become dependent upon such credit are
frequently victimized by their regular suppliers or are in a competitively unenviable
position when they shop in the open market for goods. For all of these reasons
large concerns customarily make slight use of trade credit as such; instead they
Research, New York, 1940), Chapter 8. See also other volumes in the National Bureau of Economic
Research series entitled Studies in Consumer Installment Financing; also RETAIL CREDIT StavY: 1943
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, 1944).
63 See, for example, RETAIL CREDIT SURVEY: 1943, op. cit. supra note 52.
"In some situations receivables financing alleviates, though it does not erase, this difficulty.
How SMALL BusiNEss COMPETES FOR FuNDs
tend to finance inventory on a less expensive basis through internal and other
external sources of funds.
Private Venture Capital. Prior to the First World War the credit and capital
requirements of business, particularly small business, were largely met from local
private venture capital. That the private investor still supplies some credit and
capital is indicated, for example, in the results of the Commerce study already cited,
where about 4 percent of the replying small manufacturers stated that they Used
personal and private loans to help meet their working capital needs, and 7 percent
stated that they used such loans to help meet long-term capital needs. 55 The per-
sonal funds of small entrepreneurs who invest in their own businesses is likewise
still a source of capital. For example, of a sample of enlisted service men who in
a recent survey indicated definite intentions to start their own businesses, some 45
percent stated that they intended to invest between $2,0oo and $io,ooo, and 4 per-
cent said they would invest more than $ioooo.5
It is plain, however, as these figures themselves help indicate, that the local in-
vestor is now of minor importance as a direct source of business venture capital. A
number of factors, most of them revolving about the fundamental changes that
have taken place in the technological bases of our economy, are responsible. New
methods of transportation and communication, new production techniques, and the
growth of production for a national market which these other changes made pos-
sible, destroyed the investor's earlier orientation primarily in terms of his own
community; and the new "big-time" ventures often required so much capital that
local sources could not supply it anyhow. The concommitant rise of nation-wide
security markets, and of security speculation, provided expanded outlets for invest-
ment which drew funds away from local investment. The growth of metropolitan
areas helped destroy the personal contacts which were the basis of much of the
older investment activity. The private investor as a source of venture capital now
tends to be looked upon by most large businesses, and many small ones, not as a
standard way to obtain risk money but as a sort of last resort. This is clearly im-
plied in the Commerce study which indicates that more than twice as many of the
sampled small manufacturers reporting credit difficulties relied on personal and pri-
vate loans as those reporting no credit difficulty.
Application of the test criteria appears then, to lead to the following conclusions:
While private investors enter into direct, active financial participation in small ven-
tures much more frequently than in large ones, the whole tendency in recent years
has been for them to use their resources for "passive" investment in the security
issues of large corporations or of the government. Moreover the typical private
investor is willing to accept a much lower return from his "safe" portfolio of gov-
ernment or large corporation securities; conversely, he tends to expect a "speculative"
return as well as a normal rate of interest from any money he puts in a small enter-
" Op. cit. supra note 7, at 66.
" Myers, Post-War Business Plans of Gl's (Jan. 1945) DoMesTic COMMERC_ ii, also, the same
author's Small Business for Veterans, this symposium, p. 344.
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prise. He also frequently demands a share of actual control. Thus the large con-
cern is generally able to obtain money indirectly from the individual private investor
far more economically than the small concern can obtain it directly.
The Capital Markets. Although use of the capital markets is a standard method
by which the large corporation can obtain funds, the source is largely unavailable
to small business. This is suggested by the Commerce survey, which found that
only some 12 percent of the replying manufacturers stated that they made any use
of stock or bond issues for meeting long-term capital requirements.
As Gromfine states on the basis of SEC data:
"For all practical purposes the organized capital markets are closed to small business. The
cost of small security issues (less than $250,000) is seldom less than io percent and some-
times almost 25 percent of the issue. It ranges up to five times the cost to large com-
panies and makes financing through the sale of stocks and bonds highly impractical for
small firms."' T
Contrary to popular impression, the cost of SEC registration is not an important
factor in explaining the difficulty of small issues. The statute has permitted exemp-
tion from registration of issues of less than $1oooo; an amendment has recently
increased the exemption limit to $3ooooo.08 Where registration is necessary, studies
by the SEC based on the period 1938-1940 show that the cost of registration for issues
of less than $i million averages only 6.56 percent of the cost of flotation of the issue
(not of the total amount of the issue). 5
Moreover, even when the small firm does pay the expense of an issue, it is apt
to have great difficulty in selling it. For example, another SEC study 0 shows that
only 24 percent of the value of securities registered by 757 unseasoned companies,
mostly small companies, were actually sold. Of these issues, 497 were for new
ventures for which only 15 percent of the amount registered could be disposed of;
even the remaining 260 companies, which were going concerns, sold only 40 per-
cent of the amount issued.
Summarizing in terms of the test criteria, it appears that in spite of difficulties
a minority of small firms obtain capital through security issues, but that the cost
to them of obtaining money this way is several times the cost to large concerns.
And since, once issued, the securities of small companies are generally only partially
sold, the cost to them is apt to be again doubled or multiplied several-fold.
Parent Companies. If a small company is an affiliate of another concern, it can
often obtain funds from the parent company. A small minority of the manufac-
turers included in the Commerce study stated they obtained short or long-term
" GROMFINE, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF SMALL BUSINESS (study pre-
pared in the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor, Washington, 1943, and distributed
by the Smaller War Plants Corporation for administrative use) 57.
" Public Law 55, 7 9 th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945), ch. 122. On effects of securities regulation, see later
in this symposium, Margraf, Does Securities Regulation Hinder Financing Small Business, p. 30.
"' Cited by WEIssMN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 58.
" S. E. C., SALES RECosu oF UNSEASONED REGISTERED SECURITIES (1941) p. 3 and Table I.
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funds in this manner.61  Or if a small concern is presently not affiliated it can
frequently become so if it wants. Many large manufacturers, mail order houses,
etc., are constantly on the lookout for small firms-especially those making more
or less unique products-which they can take over as branches or affiliates. Sim-
ilarly, oil companies, chain drug stores, grocery chains, etc., often seek retailers
whom they can buy out, take a financial interest in, or establish as more or less
independent outlets. Credit relief is often stressed as an advantage in such proposals.
By definition any such affiliation implies a loss of independence; and many is
the small businessman who, prodded by his acute need for working or long-term
money, has got it at the expense of losing all effective control over his company.
Yet the syllogism must not be applied carelessly. Affiliation may in some cases
increase the capacity and efficiency of the small concern; the Research Institute of
America goes so far as to say 2 that "Odds are that the small manufacturer, supplier
or distributor who associates himself with a large company has the most secure
future." But it adds that "On the other hand, many companies don't want to pay
the price of their independence which such association frequently costs." More-
over concentration of business control has economic, political, and even sociological
implications far beyond the immediate effects on the concerns directly involved.
Though they cannot be examined in this article, it is possible that affiliated
groups of small concerns may prove as effective for peacetime production as they
have in some instances for wartime production. A related possibility is for groups
9f small firms jointly to set up special service organizations designed to provide
financial, technical research, accounting, and similar services on a larger scale than
any of the members could individually manage63
Private Industrial Development Groups. Although it cannot be treated in this
paper, another source of small business funds, particularly long-term loan and
equity funds, is the private industrial development group. A companion article in
this symposium describes one such group-the Baltimore Industrial Corporation-
which has operated on a modest but successful scale for a number of years. The
Louisville Industrial Foundation is another well-known example. 4
Ferdinand Eberstadt, in a recent address65 on the financial' problems of small
business, concludes in part as follows:
With all these conditions and circumstances in mind, I suggest for your consideration
that local communities might tackle the job of furnishing capital to small and new
enterprises by forming local investment companies or pools of capital to be obtained
01 Op. ct. supra note 7, at 66.
"RESEARCH INsrTuTE op' AmERICA, THE SMiLI.ER CoMPANY AFERt THE WAR (1944) 2.
"On these two possibilities cf. BusINEss WEEK, Sept. 4, 1943, P. 34, and MODERN DiSTRIBUTION',
April 13, 1945, P. 2.
" Cf. HOPKINS, THE LOUISVILLE INDUSTRIAL FOUNDATION: A STUDY IN COMMUNITY CAPITALIZATION
oF LOCAL INDUSTIES (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 1945).
" Remarks of F. Eberstadt before the 27th Annual Convention of the National Association of Securi-
ties Commissioners at St. Louis, Missouri, on December 12, 1944 (mimeographed: F. Eberstadt & Co.,
New York). Reprinted in Commercial & Financial Chronicle (New York) December 21, 1944, P. 9.
236 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
from local businesses, banks, and public spirited citizens without imposing an undue
burden on any individual or group. If certain reasonable requirements are met, govern-
ment could well supply additional funds through preferred stock as it did to the banks.
Perhaps such companies could be encouraged through special State and Federal tax
advantages.
Such organizations could purchase equity shares in small and new enterprises, hold-
ing them for a time, subject to redemption out of profits, or to be disposed of through
local investment dealers....
The Investment Bankers Association has recently backed the principle implicit
in Eberstadt's proposal by formally recommending a nation-wide system of local
community investment companies. Under the IBA program the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System would have authority to grant charters to
local investment companies. The Federal Reserve bank of the particular district
would be obligated to purchase debentures of the local company up to an amount
equal to three times its paid-in capital. The local company would be authorized
to purchase for investment or resale mortgage bonds, debentures, preferred and common
stocks of corporations within the Federal Reserve District, and to make loans to unin-
corporated businesses. The amount of such loans made to, or securities purchased at
any one time from a single issuer would be limited to $zoo,ooo.",
It is perfectly true that the record of private industrial development groups has
to date been spotty.6T Such groups have, for example, often been used as devices
to enable a few men to preempt control of promising local ventures. Yet it is rea-
sonable to suppose that such tactics need not characterize private industrial develop-
ment groups. As an analogy, certain of the more flagrant practices commonly
employed by corporations in the "empire-building" days of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century have been outlawed by statute or have otherwise become
unfashionable. Private industrial groups can be regulated by special legislation if
necessary. The evidence suggests that, as sources of long-term financing as well as
technological, production and marketing assistance, such groups may warrant much
increased attention in the future. In terms of the three criteria, these groups already
appear in at least a few instances to have provided most of their assistance to
medium-sized or small concerns; to have helped small concerns obtain equity and
other long-term funds more economically than through alternative sources; and
to have made it possible for small companies to reduce their handicap compared to
large companies in securing funds and other assistance.
IV. PUBLIC SOURCES
Federal Reserve Assistance under Section i 3 b. In 1934, in the midst of great
business hardship, Congress amended the Federal Reserve Act to include Section
i 3b, authorizing direct loans by Federal Reserve banks s This was a departure
J ournal of Commerce (New York), April 25, 1945, pp. I and 6.
e Cf. CH. OF COMM. OF U. S., COMMUNITY INDUSTRIAL FINANCING PLANS (Washington, mimeo-
graphed, undated but issued in 1939).
68 48 STAT. 1105 (1934), 12 U. S. C. (1940) §352a.
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from the original central bank theory which held that the Federal Reserve banks
should be restricted to dealings with banking institutions. At the time it was
enacted, many considered Section i 3b a somewhat radical measure. Section i3b
permits the Federal Reserve banks to make direct loans to any established industrial
or commercial enterprise, provided the concern is unable to obtain from the usual
sources the necessary financial assistance on a reasonable basis. The maturity of
any such loan must be not more than five years, and the loan is to be used for
working capital purposes only. Section i 3 b also authorizes any Federal Reserve
bank to enter into participation commitments with other banks in its district to
take over up to 8o percent of a loan either when the loan is made or at any time
the local bank should desire it. The act also provides for the appointment of in-
dustrial advisory committees in each Federal Reserve district to make recommenda-
tions on all i 3b loans.
Under Section i3 b and other powers already possessed, the FederalfReserve banks
may thus make loans directly to a borrowing firm, discount for or purchase such
obligations from any financial institution in their districts, make loans to the financ-
ing institution on the security of these obligations, or enter into participation com-
mitments with regard to such discounts or loans. In a regulation issued shortly
after the Act of 1934 became law, the Federal Reserve Board stated that in passing
the Act, Congress had recognized "the need of many small and medium-sized in-
dustrial and commercial businesses for additional working capital to enable them
to resume normal operations and to maintain employment or provide additional
employment.""0 This was confirmed by a press release issued about the same time
which stated that loans under Section i 3 b would be chiefly "to small and medium-
size enterprises, which have the greatest need for such assistance.""
Activity under Section i 3b reached its peak in 1935. At the end of that year,
total credit outstanding amounted to $69 million. Of this total, $32 million 71 was
in Federal Reserve bank loans outstanding, $28 million was in Federal Reserve
bank commitments to make advances, and $9 million was in financing institution
participations not covered by Federal Reserve bank commitments. 2 Even these
peak amounts were not large in view of some appraisals of the magnitude of un-
filled business credit needs or in comparison with the operations of the commercial
banks, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, or the Smaller War Plants Cor-
poration. Since 1935, although there has been a mild increase in participations by
financing institutions, operations under Section i 3 b have declined rapidly. There
do 12 CODE FED. REGS. (1939), Explanatory Letter following §2ig.8 (Federal Reserve Board: "Dis-
counts, Purchases, Loans and Commitments by Federal Reserve Banks to Provide Working Capital for
Established Industrial or Commercial Businesses, Regulation S, approved June 26, x934" [Washington,
1934] x).
7 Press Release, Federal Reserve Board, June 28, 1934, reported in (July 1934) 20 FED. REs. Buu.
429, 430.
" On the basis of additional data obtained from the Federal Reserve Board, it appears that only about
$2o million of this total was in the form of direct advances to business enterprises.
"' (March 1945) 31 FED. Ras. BULL. 239 (table) with additional interpretation by Federal Reserve
authorities.
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was a slight increase in activity in the early defense and war period, but by the end
of I944 obligations outstanding reached the lowest point in the history of the pro-
gram and were of negligible proportions."3 For the war period the chief explana-
tion for the collapse in lending and participation activity under Section I3b is the
large war production loan program inaugurated in mid-1942 under Federal Reserve
Regulation V. The steady decline before the war is somewhat more difficult to
account for; the common explanation that the need for credit under Section 13b
passed with the end of depression conditions is not reassuring. Other possible rea-
sons are that RFC credit facilities received far more publicity, and that the 13b
program was handicapped by the requirements that loans be only for working
capital (so that they could not, for example, finance the purchase of machinery),
only for established enterprises, and with a maximum maturity of five years.
Although the program based on Section i3b was announced as being primarily
for small and medium-sized business, this part of the business community turned
out in practice not to be the major recipient of funds. For example in the second
half of 1937, the latest period for which data are available, only 2i percent of the
industrial advances, including commitments, approved by the Federal Reserve banks
were reflected in loans of $5o,ooo or less. Seventy-nine percent were reflected in
loans of over $5oooo, and 30 percent were reflected in loans of over $400,0o0o. 4 If
small borrowers are defined as those requesting loans of $io,ooo or less, then only 3
percent of the funds allotted were to borrowers of that type. It is true that a sub-
stantial proportion of the number of loans, as distinguished from the amount of
funds, went to small concerns; but, particularly in view of relative needs, this is
not a satisfactory test.
A bill 5 (known as the Wagner-Spence bill) recently introduced in the Senate,
and a companion measure76 in the House, would further amend the Federal Re-
serve Act to remove the direct lending provision of Section i3b and instead to
permit the Federal Reserve banks to guarantee up to a 90 percent of any bank loan
to a business enterprise. 7 The restriction that loans may be for a maximum of
five years and for working capital purposes only would be removed. These bills
carry the endorsement of the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. Federal Reserve is a central agency in the recommendations (al-
ready mentioned under private industrial development groups) of the Investment
Bankers Association. Rudolph L. Weissman has proposed the creation of a Federal
Reserve Investment Corporation based in part on the Federal Reserve System. His
7 Ibid.
14 Based on data in "Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Covering Operations for the Year 1937" (Washington, 1938) 61.
• S. 511, 79th Cong., rst Sess., introduced February 12, 1945.
7 8 H. R. 591, 7 9 th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945).
*It would seem worthwhile to consider modifying these measures to set a maximum-perhaps
Saoo,ooo-on the individual size of loan which could be guaranteed by Federal Reserve; or critcria
resembling those employed by Smaller War Plants Corporation (see infra note 9o ) might be incorporated.
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recent book' s also summarizes other proposals for increasing the Federal Reserve
System's usefulness to small business.
Summarizing in terms of the test criteria, the bulk of the funds lent or com-
mitted under Section i3b have (judging by size of loan as the only available basis)
gone to large rather than small business. Although the data on this point are
meager, interest rates and collateral requirements-whether of the Federal Reserve
banks making direct loans or of the banks making loans on the basis of Federal
Reserve participation or commitments-have apparently been more liberal for the
larger loans. Large corporations have been able to get working capital either from
the Federal Reserve banks themselves or from other sources at less cost than small
companies have been able to get it under Section i3b.
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Activities under Section 5 d. The RFC
was first authorized to make loans to industry in 1933 under the so-called N.R.A.
program for lending funds through mortgage loan companies. It was in 1934, how-
ever, that Public Law 417 (73 rd Congress), already referred to as having added
Section i 3b to the Federal Reserve Act, also added Section 5d to the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation Act. Section 5 d, though subsequently amended a number of
times, has since 1934 served as the legislative basis for business loans. As amended,
it stipulates that RFC is permitted "to purchase the securities and obligations of,
and to make loans to, any business enterprise when capital or credit, at prevailing
rates for the character of loan applied for, is not otherwise available.79 Such
loans or purchased securities must be "of such sound value, or so secured, as rea-
sonably to assure retirement or repayment." This last provision, inserted in 1938
in lieu of the earlier blanket "adequately secured" would seem to permit RFC to
make unsecured character loans; but the then chairman, in testimony before a con-
gressional committee," felt that the amended Act did not permit such loans. The
Act contains certain other lending criteria, such as that the borrowing firm must
be in a solvent condition and that loans may be made in participation with banks.
Section 5 d(2), added in 1941, permits RFC to make loans for national defense
purposes. RFC has also become the processing agent for all applications, originating
with banks and other financial institutions, for business loans made to veterans of
the Second World War and guaranteed by the Veterans Administration under
Public Law 346, 78th Congress (the so-called "G. I. Bill of Rights" Act). This
function includes a recommendation in each case as to whether the application war-
rants a guarantee.
As of the end of December, 1944, RFC had made loans and commitments to
business enterprises for other than defense purposes totalling $661 million! 1 Al-
though RFC's legislative basis would appear to have allowed it to serve as a primary
source of small business credit, and although numerically speaking a considerable
e Supra note 15. 79 15 U. S. C. (1940) §6o6b.
o Hearings on H. R. 40z2 (H. R. 3383), February 7-9, 1939; cited in T. N. E. C., PROBLEMS o
SMALL Busi~mss (Monograph No. 17, Senate Committee print, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 194) 228.
"' RFC, Release of January io, 1945, p- 3.
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proportion of RFC's loans and commitments have been for small concerns, the
vast bulk of the 366i million total has been employed for the benefit of large com-
panies. If small borrowers are again arbitrarily defined as those asking for $io,ooo
or less, then only some 3.5 percent of RFC's funds have been used for the benefit
of this class of borrower. Only 16.5 percent of RFC's loans and commitments have
gone to borrowers of $So,ooo or less. The picture for RFC defense loans is even
less favorable to small business; 74 percent of the funds were allotted to loans of more
than one million dollars.
Interest on RFC loans has been reduced from an earlier 6 percent to 4 percent.
The interest rate on all RFC loans is stated by RFC authorities to have been 6
percent from April i, 1934 (when lending operations under Section 5d began) to
May 15, 1935; uniformly 5 percent from then until April 1, 1939; and uniformly
4 percent from that date to the present."2 Banks participating with RFC have,
from the start of the program, been allowed to charge a maximum interest rate of
6 percent on their portion of the loans. Unlike commercial bank term loans, prac-
tically all RFC term loans have been secured. Forms of security have included
mortgages or liens on fixed assets such as real estate, plant, and equipment, pledge
of inventories, assignment of accounts receivable, cash surrender value of life insur-
ance policies, and endorsements of stockholders and others with independent finan-
cial resources.
s3
On March 1, 1945 the Board of Directors of RFC passed a resolution8 4 providing
for a liberalized program under Section 5d. Under this program RFC has notified
all banks in the country that it stands ready to execute a "participation" offer for
any portion through 75 percent of any loan the bank wishes to make to a private
enterprise, so long as the loan is for not over $25o,ooo and conforms to certain
other conditions. Interest on the guaranteed portion of the loan must not exceed
4 percent, 6 though the bank can charge up to but not exceeding 6 percent on the
unguaranteed portion. Government participation may be either on a deferred basis,
with a pledge to come in on ten days' notice whenever requested, or on an immedi-
ate basis.
82 RFC authorities state that on some loan contracts in the hands of borrowers the interest rate is
still stated as 5 percent or 6 percent, but that on all such contracts the borrower has been billed only
at the standard RFC interest rate prevailing at the time the billing was made.
:' JAcoBY AND SAULNIER, Op. cit. supra note 2o, at 61.
8' Reconstruction Finance Corporation: Resolution, dated March 1, 1945.
85 The Government guarantee charge (also called a participation charge, though this term might well
be reserved for participation loans involving joint advances of funds) is as follows: where the RFC
guarantees over 75 percent and up to go percent (the maximum guarantee), of the loan, the guarantee
charge is i percent per annum of the guaranteed portion of the loan; where RFC guarantees over 5o
percent and up to 75 percent, the guarantee charge is 34 of x percent; and where RFC guarantees up
through 50 percent, the guarantee charge is Y2 of s percent. (Under the new program, guarantees
through 75 percent are handled under a blanket standard-contract agreement; guarantees above that
percentage require special approval of the RFC Board of Directors.) In every case the bank retains
the balance (ranging from 3 to 3% percent) of the 4 percent interest rate to the customer on the
guaranteed portion of the loan. This makes an attractive investment for the bank; for example, alter-
native investment in U. S. Government bonds of long maturity would, on the basis of current yields, re-
turn only around 2Y2/ percent, and Government bonds of maturities comparable to those of the guaran-
teed loans might yield less than 2 percent.
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Perhaps the most interesting innovation in the new program is that amortized
loans with a maturity of up to ten years are permitted. Heretofore, although the
amended RFC act has not required it, maturities have generally been kept to five
years.
Applying the test criteria, it is clear that most of the money RFC has up to the
present advanced under Section 5 d has been used for the benefit of large rather
than small business. RFC interest rates have, however, been twice reduced and
have apparently been uniform for large and small borrowers. 8  RFC security re-
quirements, though they have probably shown some variation as between large
and small concerns, have been much more uniform in this respect than security
requirements on bank term loans. On the other hand term loans obtained by
small concerns from RFC have often or generally been at higher cost and for
shorter maturities than large concerns have been able to get similar funds from
banks, for example.
Although it is naturally too early to appraise the probable results of RFC's new
program, if it is pursued vigorously and with particular emphasis on small business
term loans, drastic alteration of some of the foregoing statements may become
possible.
Smaller War Plants Corporation. Congress created the Smaller War Plants
Corporation in 1942 by enacting the so-called Murray-Patman Bill as Public Law
603 (77th Congress). The act stated that the new corporation should have capital
stock of $150 million subscribed for by the Government through the Secretary of
the Treasury. 7 The Act vested the management of SWPC in a* Board of five
directors appointed by the Chairman of the War Production Board. A more recent
statute"8 extends the life of SW'PC to December 31, 1946 (instead of to June 30,
1945 as provided in the original Act) and transfers the power of appointment of
the directors to the President.
Among the fiscal powers which Section 4 (f) of the Act delegates to SWPC are
the power to make loans; the power to make bank participations; the power to
purchase land, buildings, equipment, etc.; and the power to lease, sell, or otherwise
dispose of, land, plants, supplies, and the like. Specifically framed for the benefit
of small business, the Act gives SWPC broad discretion to determine those who
should receive financial assistance, the specific objects and purposes of such financ-
ing, and the terms and conditions to be set.
While in the early period of its existence SWPC served primarily as a procure-
ment agency assisting small business in obtaining war contracts, its lending powers
have in the last year and a half assumed great importance. The basic loan policies
which SWPC employs in practice 9 are as follows:
" Participating banks have on the other hand often or usually charged more interest on their share
of small loans than on their share of large loans.
" Late in x944 Congress passed a bill increasing the capitalization of SWPC to $35o million. Act
of Dec. 8, 1944, ch. 549, 58 STAT. 799.
s Act of April 27, 1945, Public Law 42, 79th Cong., ist Sess.
"0 This information is based largely on SWPC internal memoranda; they are restated in more gen-
eral terms in the SWPC official pamphlet entitled LOANS TO SMALL BusiNEss (Washington, 1945).
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i. The applicant must be a small90 manufacturing plant which adds to the value of
some product.
2. The applicant must be engaged, or expect to be engaged, in the production of
goods for war or essential civilian purposes.
3. There must be a reasonable prospect that the loan will be repaid.
4. The applicant's bank must always be offered the opportunity to take all or part
of the loan.
Under its regular program SWPC makes term loans of from one to five years
as well as short term loans. On all loans, and regardless of size of loan or size of
company, SWPC charges a uniform interest rate of 4 percent. However, when the
loan is in participation with a bank or other private lending institution-and there
is increasing bank participation in the SWPC loan program-the bank may charge
as much as, but not more than, 6 percent for its share of the loan. The regional
SVPC loan agent passes upon SWPC loans of $25,ooo or less; other loans are
approved in Washington. Leases are approved in Washington.
By virtue of a legislative compromise at the time Public Law 603 was enacted,
an RFC subsidiary, the Defense Plants Corporation, was authorized to service all
SWPC loans and leases. Under a subsequent agreement the managers of RFC
loan agencies have also until recently disbursed all applications for financial assist-
ance approved by SWPC. This strange tripartite arrangement, though partly justi-
fied by an emergency situation in which RFC and DPC had field loan disbursing
and servicing facilities whereas SWPC had none, is alleged by some observers to
have caused delays and inefficiencies in SWPC operations because SWPC loans have
had to be closed and disbursed in accordance with a complicated RFC code and
closing schedule which was not designed for joint RFC-SWPC operations. SWPC
has recently opened a trial disbursement office to serve the Philadelphia area.
In addition to its regular loan program under authority of Public Law 603,
SWPC has the power to provide the following three other types of financial
assistance:
i. Under authority of the Contract Settlement Act of I944"' and of regulations
issued by the Office of Contract Settlement, SWPC makes termination loans or
"T-Loans"9 2 to small manufacturers who have been engaged in war production-
either as prime contractors or subcontractors-and whose war contracts have been
terminated for the convenience of the Government. Such loans are intended pri-
marily for reconversion purposes.
" For lending purposes, SWPC defines a small plant as one employing less than 5oo wage earners,
exclusive of office and sales personnel; or a branch or subsidiary of a corporation whose total employ-
ment, including main plant and branches and subsidiaries, is less than 500 wage earners; or, by way of
exception, a plant which employs more than 500 wage earners but whose dollar volume of output
accounts for a relatively small percentage of the total output of its industry; or, by way of exception, a
plant which employs more than 500 wage earners but whose operation is necessary to the relief of
economic distress in loose labor areas, particularly if it is the main source of employment in its
community.
9158 STAT. 649, 8 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1944) §IoI et seq.
" Commercial banks, industrial banks and other financial institutions are also eligible to make
"T-Loans."
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2. The Surplus Property Act of 1944P3 authorizes SWPC to make loans to
small business for the purpose of purchasing Government surplus property. SWPC
has formulated policies for participation in surplus property disposal under this
statute.
3. The Veterans Administration on January 16, 1945, designated SWPC as a
processing agent for business loans to be guaranteed by the Veterans Administra-
tion. While, as noted above, RFC processes applications from banks and other
lending institutions operating under federal or state supervision, SWPC processes
all other applications, including particularly those from equipment manufacturers
desiring to sell equipment to veterans on a deferred payment basis.
SWPC lending activities have been, in practice as well as in legislative theory,
mainly for small business. As of the end of 1944, SWPC was making loans and
leases at the rate of approximately $1.2 million per dayY4 Of the total funds,
cumulated through the end of 1944, which SWPC has made available to business
enterprises, 30 percent has been in amounts less than $io,ooo and over 75 percent
has been in amounts under $5oooo.
Summarizing in terms of the test criteria, all of the financial assistance provided
through SWPC has been for the benefit of medium-sized or small business; and
most of it has been for small business. In terms of rates and other conditions for
assistance, there has been less discrimination as between small and large borrowers
by SWPC than by the other public agencies reviewed or by most of the private
agencies reviewed. On the other hand large business is often able to obtain both
short-term and medium-term money from the sources to which it has access more
economically than small business is able to obtain such money from SWPC.
Public Industrial Development Groups. In addition to the private industrial
development groups mentioned in Section III, there is at least one current ex-
ample 5 of a similar public96 effort designed to assist in providing long-term financ-
ing for manufacturing enterprises.97  This is the State of Mississippi's program-
known as the "BAWI" (balance agriculture with industry) plan-under which the
State has authorized and assisted local governmental units to issue bonds, under
state direction and control, for the purpose of providing buildings and equipment
to be used for manufacturing purposes by client concerns. This experiment is ably
03 58 STAT. 766, 50 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1944) §161i et seq.
"Press Release, Smaller War Plants Corporation, December 29, 1944.
"For an interesting case involving an earlier analagous program in North Dakota, see Green v.
Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (1920).
" It is probably impossible to establish any precise line of demarcation between public and private
industrial development groups. For a discussion throwing light on this point, see HopicNs, op. cit. supra
note 64, at x-5.
" Public bodies have of course directly financed many types of utilities in this country, including
transportation lines, electric power facilities, waterfront facilities, et cetera. in addition a number of
states have promoted, and financed the preliminary development of, mineral deposits. This discussion
is limited to cases where public bodies have directly sponsored, and partially financed, private manufac-
turing or service ventures other than utilities or ventures for the purpose of exploiting natural resources.
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described in a study"8 issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. It is likely
that the public industrial development group deserves, particularly in terms of its
potential role in providing equity and other long-term financing for small business,
much more study and attention than it has hitherto received.99
V. PROFIT IN LIEu OF OUTSIDE SOURCES
Undistributed profit has traditionally been regarded as the best source of capital
for both short-range and long-range purposes. In the past many companies financed
their expansion, usually on a relatively slow but sure basis, through profit-plough-
back. Some concerns-notably the Ford Motor Company-have relied exclusively
on profit to finance their expansion to great size; but that is not typical.
Reliance upon profit for operating and expansion needs reduces the likelihood
of outside influence and control in the management of company affairs. Capital
obtained out of income is also generally an economical source of funds. Yet money
retalined from profits to finance expansion or for working capital purposes is not
"free" because (quite aside from any sacrifices entailed in earning it) if it is not
kept for these purposes it can be invested elsewhere or distributed as dividends
which tend to make investors look upon the company as a good place to put their
funds.
Moreover, ploughed-back profits may not offer a sufficient volume of funds to
implement ambitious expansion plans. It is common knowledge that, usually in
spite of favorable balance sheets, most of the country's large corporations rely on
security issues and other outside sources of money to complement the internal source.
Typically it is through acquiring capital "in the grand manner," not simply by
building from within, that a corporation comes to dominate a particular market;
conversely, if in the modern economy a firm is content to rely on "slow-but-sure"
expansion through the traditional profits plough-back, it is likely to find that the
more aggressive fiscal tactics of competitors (which in turn make possible more
aggressive product research, market research, sales promotion, et cetera) will drive
it from part or all of its present market.
Thus the large corporation may finance expansion and current operations directly
through the plough-back, or indirectly by employing profits as collateral to obtain
low-cost loans or by distributing profits in such a manner as to build a reputation
for its security issues; and these indirect applications of profits have steadily grown
in importance.
The smaller company, on the other hand, is typically at a disadvantage, first
9
"HoPKINS, Mississippi's BAWl PLAN: AN EXPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL SUBSIDIZATION (Federal Re-
serve Bank of Atlanta, 1944). See also RtuBER, THE ALABAMA STATE DocKs: A CASE STUDY IN STATE
DEvELOPMENT (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 1945).
" Public Industrial Development groups might in the future provide (as some of the private indus-
trial development groups already provide) technological assistance and other management aid or counsel
for small ventures they seek to encourage. There is, incidentally, a noticeable tendency on the part of
financing institutions, including commercial banks and insurance companies, to put managerial pro-
visions into loan contracts.
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because it has to employ its profits in a more limited manner, and secondly because
it has less profits available. It has already been pointed out that the small company
has only limited and expensive access to the securities markets, and that it has great
difficulty borrowing outside money, particularly term money, at advantageous rates.
On the score of profits available, Professor Crum's painstaking analysis of corporate
size and earning power concludes that, in terms of profits after taxes, "The larger
the corporation the higher is the rate of return, on the average; and this relation
holds, with surprising constancy, in each of the size years i93i-i936" covered by
the investigation.10 If only those corporations which actually made a profit are
considered, there is "some indication" that the returns for the smaller size classes
were greater than those for the larger; but though some small deficit corporations
may be "constitutionally" marginal, many deficit corporations are in that predica-
ment simply because they are "unseasoned." A study recently appearing in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin""' tentatively concludes that during the war period the
earnings of small businesses (both before and after taxes) increased more rapidly
than those of large concerns; but there is no indication that this situation will sus-
tain itself after the emergency.
It is well to note, finally, that present tax laws are for two general reasons par-
ticularly burdensome on the small company: first, because present taxes particularly
affect the expanding concern and the small company very often is (or otherwise
could be) expanding; and secondly, because tax withdrawals are particularly seri-
ous for the small concern because of its limited access to the money market. Present
tax policies thus make small business term loans, and other intermediate and long-
term sources of small business funds, more necessary than ever.
Applying the test criteria to profits as the internal source of funds, it appears
clear that at least in the years before the war emergency, this source was more
widely available to large concerns than to small ones. Profits tend to be a more
voluminous and economical source of funds for large concerns than for small, be-
cause large companies make important indirect use of profits as collateral for loans
from various sources and as a performance indicator to help float security issues.
These funds obtained indirectly from outside sources commonly place large firms
at a marked competitive advantage over their smaller rivals.
VI. CONCLUSION
The evidence presented in this paper appears to lead to the view that small busi-
ness is at a marked competitive disadvantage when it seeks to meet its credit and
capital needs. Small concerns generally obtain short-term bank loans only on terms
considerably more onerous and expensive than large concerns can secure the same
type of funds from banks or in the commercial money market. From no source
oo CRUM, CORPORATIE SIZE AND EARNING POWER (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1939) 32.
01 Dirks, Wartime Earnings of Small Business (Tan. 1945) 31 FED. Ras. BULL. 16. Cf. Working
Capital for Small Business (Nov. 1944) CONPEIaENCE Bo AR BusIuss REcoRD (National Industrial Con-
ference Board, Inc., New York) which comes to somewhat different conclusions.
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can small concerns obtain short-term credit as inexpensively as large business can
obtain similar funds from the sources at its command, the nearest exceptions usually
being the factors, the Smaller War Plants Corporation, and RFC. Small concerns
commonly have difficulty in obtaining intermediate or long-term credit from private
sources, and where they are able to do so, it is only at substantially greater sacrifice
than large concerns can obtain the same type of money. In general the nearest
exceptions to this statement are term loans offered in some cases by local or state
development groups and by two public agencies (SWPC and RFC); but even these
funds are not on a basis to equalize the differential. Small business is not in gen-
eral able to obtain equity funds on any reasonable basis from the organized capital
markets; and even in the use of its relatively sparser profits for plough-back pur-
poses small business is at a competitive disadvantage. It is a reasonable deduction
that the competitive handicap faced by small concerns in meeting their credit and
capital needs is one important cause of the general competitive disadvantage in
which they often find themselves.
There are two appropriate vantage points from which one may regard the prob-
lem of lack of small business access to adequate loan funds on competitively equal
terms. In the first place one may-for example in the case of the commercial banks
-postulate that the rates and other conditions set for loans to small borrowers are
"discriminatory." There have been numerous discussions of relative bank risks
and costs for large and small loans,1 °2 and most of them agree that the cost (in-
cluding allowance for losses) of making and servicing small commercial loans is
markedly greater than the cost of making and servicing large loans. Yet one might
argue that, because of the relative bargaining positions of large and small concerns
and for other reasons, the differentials in rates and other conditions are often greater
than warranted by cost differentials.'
As a second vantage point one may postulate that present sources of small busi-
ness funds, notably the commercial banks, are inadequate not because of any sig-
nificant arbitrary discrimination in rates and other terms, and not because of any
lack of lendable funds, but because the national interest requires an entirely new
set of credit policies oriented in terms of socially desirable, not simply bankable,
risks.
Under this second postulate one may advance either or both of two arguments.
It is possible to claim that the banks, in order to make ends meet, can never modify
their policies in favor of "socially-oriented" programs, and that therefore (assuming
that other private agencies cannot do so) it will be necessary to have governmental
assistance to provide equal small business access to credit and capital. As an edi-
102 See, for example, Bimson, Why Small Loans Cost More, in the February and March, 1945, issues
of BANKING. Though oriented primarily in terms of consumer small loans, a number of the principles
enunciated in these articles are appropriate to small commercial loans.
.03 Many banks have only the most hazy cost data to guide them in setting their lending policies.
Certainly there is every reason for encouraging banks to determine their costs. On this point cl. Most
Small Town Banks Never Study Costs, So ,BA to Do It for Them, Wall Street Journal, September
1, 1944, pp. I and 6.
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torial comment on the appointment (on April 18, 1945) of John W. Snyder as Fed-
eral Loan Administrator puts the matter, "he (Mr. Snyder) well knows that com-
mercial banks cannot safely engage in certain types of lending, even though the need
for loans may be pressing and opportunities for socially productive employment of
borrowed funds may exist." 104
Or one can claim that if, for example, the banks wished to modify their policies
and embark on a large-scale program of term lending to small business on a con-
stant-rate basis analagous to that of SWPC, they could do so on a profit-making
basis. It is true that the attitude of bank examiners is sometimes cited as a re-
strictive influence on bank lending policies; but it seems questionable whether the
examiners are the real stumbling block. Complete liquidity of bank funds is of
course an impossibility; and the examining bodies realize that liquidity is (especially
in view of FDIC deposit insurance) a false god except in terms of the long pull.
Moreover, perusal of comments by bankers and banking groups brings to light very
few complaints against the examiners. One can argue that the banking fraternity
does not hesitate to criticize the actions of governmental bodies when it feels it has
a grievance, and that it could very well do so in this instance if it believed it had a
real case.
These considerations lead naturally to the following two-point program, here
offered without direct supporting argument, as a means of promoting equal small
business access to the credit and capital required for effective competition:'
i. A federal loan-guarantee program (perhaps sponsored by RFC or Federal Reserve
or separately by both) on a very large scale;l ° 5 or, if this proves inadequate or
could fruitfully be complemented in "yard-stick" fashion, a large-scale program
(perhaps developing from the wartime lending activities of Smaller War Plants
Corporation) of direct federal loans.
2. Under proper safeguards, maximum encouragement and stimulation (including
financial assistance from such federal agencies as Federal Reserve, RFC, and
SWPC) of local, state, and regional private, quasi-public, and public industrial
development groups as a source of long-term loan and equity capital.
... The Washington Post, April i9, 1945.
... Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace has gone on record in favor of a program of Govern-
ment guarantees for business loans made by private lending institutions. Wallace, Planning for Freedom,
RaEADR's DIor, May, 1945, PP. 3-4. Secretary Wallace also favors consideration of similar guarantees
to assist small exporters (statement before Subcommittee on Foreign Trade for Small Business of the
Senate Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business, April 17, 1945). The United
Kingdom has had a self-supporting government operated system of export-credit guarantees since 1921.
In 1944 Canada enacted a law modeled after the British plan.
